In all of life, significant events have a way of coming from unnoticed real-world, Rube Goldberg chains of cause and effect. An interesting example begins with Roman chariot wheels. They were approximately 4 ft, 8 in. apart, known from ruts preserved in roads. This spacing influenced the spacing of the standard railroad gauge, set in the early 1800s. Thus began a chain that ended with the explosion of the Challenger:
The design of the solid rocket boosters essential to launching the space shuttle was strongly influenced by the standard railroad gauge. Since the boosters were manufactured by the Morton-Thiokol Corporation at its plant in Utah, they had to be designed in such a way that they could be shipped by rail across the Rocky Mountains and on to the Kennedy Space Center in Florida. The railroads passed through the mountains via tunnels, whose width was naturally tied to the track gauge. Thus, the booster rockets had to be shipped in sections no larger than could fit through the tunnels. Once at the launch site, they could be assembled into full-size boosters by incorporating the O-rings that proved to be the design detail that initiated the Challenger failure.
(Quoted from page 67 of Success Through Failure: The Paradox of Design, by Henry Petroski. Princeton University Press, 2006.)
For a brief biography of Henry Petroski, click here. For images of or relating to Henry Petroski, click here.
For a brief biography of Rube Goldberg, click here. For images of some of Rube Goldberg’s cause and effect chains, click here.
For an account of the crash of the space shuttle Challenger, click here.
The design of the solid rocket boosters essential to launching the space shuttle was strongly influenced by the standard railroad gauge. Since the boosters were manufactured by the Morton-Thiokol Corporation at its plant in Utah, they had to be designed in such a way that they could be shipped by rail across the Rocky Mountains and on to the Kennedy Space Center in Florida. The railroads passed through the mountains via tunnels, whose width was naturally tied to the track gauge. Thus, the booster rockets had to be shipped in sections no larger than could fit through the tunnels. Once at the launch site, they could be assembled into full-size boosters by incorporating the O-rings that proved to be the design detail that initiated the Challenger failure.
(Quoted from page 67 of Success Through Failure: The Paradox of Design, by Henry Petroski. Princeton University Press, 2006.)
For a brief biography of Henry Petroski, click here. For images of or relating to Henry Petroski, click here.
For a brief biography of Rube Goldberg, click here. For images of some of Rube Goldberg’s cause and effect chains, click here.
For an account of the crash of the space shuttle Challenger, click here.
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